Al-Masdar Online – Amin Barfied
Developments on the Hadhramaut coast are heading toward a sharp confrontation between two projects that offer no clear alternative to the idea of a state that people demand. The Southern Transitional Council (STC) seeks to cement political and security representation that paves the way for it—before moving toward a national settlement—to swallow the southern and eastern provinces and monopolize their representation. Meanwhile, the “Hadhramaut Alliance” moves under the slogan of “self-governance,” a ceiling outside the existing constitutional and legal framework. In contrast, popular demand grows for state authority that provides regular electricity and fuel services and enforces a single law without external or tribal guardianship.
In this vacuum, local actors are trying to establish facts on the ground. The STC has brandished the “Security Support Forces” card—a rough arm backed by the UAE to secure its presence and counter the Alliance, which has recently intensified its activity. This force gives the STC more practical leverage, but raises legal and organizational questions about its position within the official military structure. On the other side, the Alliance presents itself as a guardian of the community’s right to oil revenues and intervenes directly in shipping and fuel distribution routes, placing it outside the state’s chain of command and opening the door to legal incrimination.
The regional dimension is clearly visible in the background. The UAE strengthens the STC through security and logistical support for a new military formation called “Security Support Forces.” Oman backs a social and tribal network represented by the Alliance leadership to counterbalance the STC’s expansion and preserve a foothold of influence on the coast. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, focuses on a long-term de-escalation, having refrained from deploying “National Shield Forces” to coastal areas, leaving its influence there limited compared with other parties.
In recent weeks, propaganda materials attributed to al-Qaeda have circulated alongside official security warnings in the coast. These materials do not bear the hallmarks of the group’s known channels, making their attribution professionally questionable. But their mere coincidence with state messages—which seem aligned with the STC in its confrontation with the Alliance—creates a kind of direct or indirect interplay: enforcement measures expand under the banner of counterterrorism, and a local dispute transforms into an open-ended security file. Unless sources and publication authenticity are independently verified, turning this coincidence into a pretext for extreme measures will only heighten tensions and could push the conflict beyond its political framework.
Alongside the roles of local and regional powers, the Presidential Leadership Council bears a direct share of responsibility for the escalation path in Hadhramaut’s coast. Instead of using a low-cost political tool such as replacing the governor—a popular demand that could have opened a window for de-escalation—the Council leaned toward maintaining the status quo, losing a chance to absorb anger and demonstrate the state’s understanding of the nature of the power struggle and its ability to impose remedies aligned with community interests. This choice does not appear separate from internal entanglements within the Council itself; the balancing of interests between its chairman and members grants priority to maintaining existing arrangements with regional partners over responding to the demands of protesters who express a state of social anger and frustration with a conflict consuming their interests.
In this context, many read the coincidence of retaining the governor with the rise of the UAE-backed “Security Support Forces” as a sign of alignment between the Presidential Council and the STC’s steps along with its regional partner—consolidating the STC’s presence on the coast and reproducing the “Shabwa formula” under a recurring official legal cover. Such a course imposes a heavy political cost on the state, weakens its presence, makes it appear to society as a party within the conflict, expands the base of tribal and civil objection, and turns security tools into a lever for re-engineering the political scene instead of serving as a protective umbrella for all.
On the ground, three realistic paths are forming. The first is a security and administrative settlement leaning toward the STC, spearheaded by the Security Support Forces taking control of supply lines and local decision-making, while exploiting the public’s exhaustion from service crises. This path grants the STC quick gains but carries social and tribal costs and requires tangible service reforms to avoid backfiring. The second is a negotiated de-escalation under Saudi sponsorship that rearranges security leadership under one official ceiling. Arrangements may include integrating Hadhramaut Protection Forces into the security apparatus, obliging the Alliance to abandon any guardianship over oil in return for social guarantees and transparent measures in loading, distribution, and sales, alongside reducing the direct footprint of the Security Support Forces and launching an emergency relief package for electricity and fuel. This is a lower-cost option but fragile, and could collapse at the first security incident or service setback. The third is a slow escalation turning into a “supply war of attrition”: arrest warrants read as politicization of the judiciary, counter-responses through expanding checkpoints and restricting fuel movement, and reciprocal shows of control by the Security Support Forces. The outcome here is prolonged attrition that exhausts society and weakens all sides without resolution.
In conclusion, Hadhramaut’s coast today stands at a crossroads between re-engineering power within the law and public service, or recycling power against them. The Alliance’s slogan of self-governance remains outside the existing legitimacy, and the STC’s project does not substitute for a neutral state governed by institutions.
A way out is still possible through a clear political decision by the Council to dismantle the causes of tension with tangible steps (appointing consensual civilian leadership, conducting transparent investigations into corruption and smuggling files, and ensuring safe energy corridors), and launching a local dialogue track that precedes and constrains any new security arrangements. Without that, every security move will be understood as paving the way to entrench one side’s influence at the expense of the state and society, prolonging uncertainty and widening the gap between what people want and what the forces on the ground are doing.
| This material was translated by ChatGPT
